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INTRODUCTION
The Mesopotamia region, within the boundaries of Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, is populated by different ethnic, national, and religious groups, which have long fought over the control of its fertile lands. Since the early 1970's, there has been an increase in tension among these countries regarding the sharing of the waters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. In particular, Turkey's development of Southeastern Anatolia, with water needed for agricultural and energy production projects, has been viewed as a threat to Syria and Iraq. This water problem is likely to be exacerbated in the future because of high population growth and urban development. To help analyze these issues, this paper formulates a water allocation optimization model, that represents, in network form, the system made of the two rivers and their various consumption (agriculture, urban centers, hydropower plants) and transshipment nodes, including the possibility of transferring water from the Euphrates to the Tigris. This model maximizes the aggregate net benefits of the three countries, including the gross benefits from water uses in agriculture, urban functions, and hydroelectricity, minus the costs of water conveyance. Cooperative game theory concepts (core, Shapley value) are used to identify stable water allocations, under which all three countries find it beneficial to cooperate. These analyses are carried out under different scenarios related to future energy prices, agricultural production efficiency, and total water availability.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The structure of the model is described in Section 2. The results of a benchmark application are presented in Section 3. Cooperative game theory applications are analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
STRUCTURE OF THE EUPHRATES AND TIGRIS RIVER BASIN MODEL (ETRBM)
The existing literature on the Euphrates and the Tigris focuses on water politics, legal analyses, and water balances, but does not provide any model for the overall optimal utilization of the basin resources. In the general water resources literature, only a few studies focus on their optimum allocation at the national and international levels.
Among them, four bear connections to the ETRBM: Booker & Young (1994) , Dinar & Wolf (1994a , 1994b , and Rogers (1969, 1993) . With regard to the river basin system structure, the ETRBM is similar to the model developed by Booker and Young (1994) for the Colorado river (CRIM -Colorado River Institutional Model). They use a nonlinear framework and account for salinity. Their goal is to allocate scarce water resources among states by creating a water market. In contrast, the ETRBM is designed as a linear program where water is allocated to agricultural and urban demand nodes in the three countries, subject to upper and lower limits to nodal water allocations. Rogers (1969) uses linear programming to compute the optimum benefits of different coalitions in the international setting of the Ganges, and then evaluates the results in a nonzero-sum game for two countries (East Pakistan and India). Incorporating Nepal into his analysis, Rogers (1994) outlines the applicability of cooperative game theory and Pareto frontier analyses to water resources allocation problems. The ETRBM, on the other hand, involves extensive applications of core and Shapley value analyses to the ETRB. and Wolf and Dinar (1994) illustrate the potential of water trading among Middle East countries (mainly Egypt and Israel), accounting for political constraints. They consider coalition alternatives but do not search for core solutions.
Spatial Structure of the ETRBM
The ETRBM includes 63 demand (i) and 45 supply (j) nodes (Figures 1). The supply nodes provide water for both urban and agricultural uses, and each demand node is served by only one supply node, taken as the most accessible node. Out of the 45 ETRBM supply nodes, 17 are in the Euphrates basin, and 28 in the Tigris basin. Turkey has 15 supply nodes: 5 in the Euphrates and 10 in the Tigris basins. Syria has 7 supply nodes, all in the Euphrates basin. Iraq has 22 supply nodes, 4 in the Euphrates and 18 in the Tigris basins. Node 45 represents the Gulf, which is assigned to Iraq, and represents the end point of all flows downstream There are three inter-basin links, all from the Tigris to the Euphrates, with one already built (from j=31 to j=16, the Tharthar Canal -see Bilen, 1994) . While one link connects Turkey to Syria (from j=21 to j=12), the other two links are located within the borders of Iraq (from j=28 to j=14 and from j=31 to j=16).
Of the 63 demand nodes, 37 are in the Euphrates basin: 16 for urban uses and 21 for agricultural uses. Of the 26 demand nodes in the Tigris basin, 10 are for urban uses and 3 16 for agriculture uses. Syria has 16 demand nodes, all of which are in the Euphrates basin, whereas Turkey and Iraq have 13 and 8 demand nodes in the Euphrates basin, and 11 and 15 demand nodes in the Tigris basin, respectively.
Figure 1: The Euphrates and Tigris River Basin Diagram

Mathematical Structure of the ETRBM
We first present the model equations, followed by the definitions of all the indices, variables, and parameters, and by a discussion of the objective function and constraints. The basic mode is made of Equations (1) -(10) : 21  12  ,  21  16  ,  31  16  ,  31  14  ,  28  14  ,  28 , ,
(2)
j=1,…,45
(3) reservoir evaporation loss at supply node j (Mm 3 ) RFR i,j : return flow rates from demand node i to supply node j SIZE i : size of demand node i (hectare for agricultural nodes, inhabitants for urban nodes) TF j : tributary and groundwater inflows at node j (Mm 3 ) FTRNSS j,l : feasibility of the link from node j to l (if feasible 1, otherwise 0) FTRNSD j,i : feasibility of the link from node j to i (if feasible 1, otherwise 0) M: very large number
Let VALAG be the unit value of water to agriculture, and let WT i be the water consumption at agricultural node i. Then the total value of the water at i is VALAG⋅WT i , and the total value of the water to all agricultural nodes is ∑ i∈agr VALAG⋅WT i . If W ji is the amount of water transferred from node j to node i, DSD ji the distance between the nodes, and AGRTC the transportation unit cost per unit distance (assumed to be spatially invariant), then the total water transport cost of getting water to node i is ∑ j W ji ⋅ DSD ji ⋅ AGRTC, and the total water transportation cost to all agricultural nodes is
Hence the net benefits of water usage to agriculture is
Similarly to water used in agriculture, let VALUR be the unit value of water to urban uses, and let WT i be the water consumption at urban node i. Then the total value of the water at i is VALUR⋅WT i , and the total value of the water to all urban nodes is ∑ i∈urb VALAG⋅WT i . If W ji is the amount of water transferred from node j to node i, DSD ji the distance between the nodes, and URBTC the transportation unit cost per unit distance (assumed to be spatially invariant), then the total water transport cost of getting water to node i is ∑ j W ji ⋅DSD ji ⋅AGRTC, and the total water transportation cost to all urban nodes is
Hence the net benefits of water usage to urban centers is
Energy benefits are measured by the market value of the energy generated by the downstream flow of water. Let EPR be the unit market price of water-generated energy, EG j the quantity of energy generated at node j per unit of water flow, and PQ jl the flow of water into downstream node l from node j. Then the value of the energy generated at j by releasing water to downstream node l is EPR⋅EG j ⋅PQ jl . The total value of energy generated in the basin is then
In the cases of interbasin water transfer links, let PQ jl be the flow of water from node j into downstream node l, DSS jl the distance between the supply nodes, and CTSS the transportation unit cost per unit distance (assumed to be spatially invariant) between the two river basins for those links. Because there are only three links, they are explicitly represented by their indices. The costs are assumed born by the country receiving the water. Let PQ 21,12 be the water flowing from Turkey to Syria, and PQ 28, 14 and PQ 31,16 the water flows within Iraq. The transportation cost for link j-l is then PQ jl ⋅CTSS⋅DSS jl . The total interbasin link costs are then calculated as follows: 
Combining the benefits and costs in Equations (11) -(14) yields the objective function represented by Equation (1).
Equation (2) computes the total water delivery to demand node i, WT i , as the sum of the deliveries W ji from all supply nodes j to node i. The water inputs to supply node j are the tributary inflows TF j , the return flows from the upstream withdrawals TRFN j , taken as the sum of the products of return flow rates and withdrawals at node i, ∑ i RFR ij ⋅WT i , and water from upstream nodes l to j, ∑ l PQ lj . The total input at node j is
On the other hand, water leaving node j is allocated to reservoir evaporation REL j , water withdrawal for agricultural and urban uses W j,i , and water release to downstream nodes Q j . Then the total amount of water leaving node j is
Combining Equations (15) and (16) leads to the water balance constraint (3) at node j.
The parameter SIZE i is a measure of the size of demand node i (either urban or agriculture), and MINAGR, MINURB, MAXAGR, MAXURB represent minimum usage rates -to sustain agricultural and urban activities -and maximum usage rates -to prevent excessive withdrawals. The total water consumption at node i, ∑ j W ji , is noted WT i , and is constrained by Equations (4) -(7). In Equation (8), Q j is expressed as the sum of all water flows released from node j to downstream nodes l, equal to ∑ l PQ jl .
Equations (9) and (10) eliminates infeasible supply-to-supply and supply-to-demand node linkages by using the 0-1 parameters FTRNSS jl a and FTRNSD jl ..
The procedures for estimating the model input parameters are fully described in Kucukmehmetoglu (2002) . They involve regional and general data sources. Supply data, including tributary and return flows, and evaporation rates, were drawn from Kolars (1986, 1992, 1994) , Kliot (1994) , Bagis (1989) , and Altinbilek (1997) . Demand data were drawn from Kolars (1992) , Kliot (1994) , Altinbilek (1997) , the CIA (1998), , Wolf and Dinar (1994) , Howitt, Mann, and Vaux (1982) , and Howe and Easter (1971) . Finally, transportation cost and energy data were drawn from Hirshleifer et al. (1969) , Gibbons (1986) , and Bilen (1994) .
BENCHMARK MODEL APPLICATION
We assume that all three countries have the same agricultural efficiency (VALAG =$25,000 /Mm 3 ), the same energy price (EPR = $25/Mwh), and that total tributary flows are average (TTF = 81.9 Billion M 3 ). Table 1 presents the net overall system benefit (NEB), the gross benefits form water use (TECBW) and from energy generation (TECBE), the total water transportation costs for urban uses (TTCURB) and for agricultural uses (TTCAGR), and the cost of interbasin transfer (TTRSS ). The table also includes the total tributary flows (TFT), the total reserve evaporation (RELT), the water released to the Gulf (GULF), the total water withdrawal (TWT), the total return flow (FRET), the total in-out balance (TOTBAL), the total agricultural water withdrawal (TWAGR), the minimum required total water withdrawal for agriculture (TWAGRMIN), the maximum total water withdrawal for agriculture (TWAGRMAX), the total urban water withdrawal (TWURB), the minimum required total water withdrawal for urban use (TWURBMIN), and the maximum total water withdrawal for urban use (TWURBMAX).
We observe that (1) energy benefits constitute nearly 50% of overall returns, (2) return flows make up almost 50% of the water input from tributaries, and are available for reuse, and (3) total water withdrawal is very close to the total tributary flow input, whereas water released to the Gulf makes up to 35% of the total tributary inflow. Table 2 presents the benefits for the overall system and each country, and includes total economic benefits (TECB), total transportation costs (TTC), net economic benefits (NBEN), the ratios of economic benefits to transportation costs (R), the percentage of economic benefits by category (PTECBW: all withdrawals; PTECBE: energy; PTECBWU: withdrawals for urban uses; PTECBWA: withdrawals for agricultural uses), and the percentages of transportation costs by use (PTTCURB: urban; PTTCAGR: Turkey derives most of her benefits (75%) from energy generation, and Iraq from agriculture (90%). The overall system optimization involves, first, the utilization of the energy generation potential at the upstream nodes, and then the utilization of the agricultural potential at the downstream nodes. The opportunity cost of withdrawing water at the upstream nodes is higher than that of withdrawing water at the downstream nodes. In Syria, the benefits are almost equally shared (56% for water withdrawals and 44% for energy generation). The ratios of benefits to costs show that Turkey has the lowest transport cost related to water withdrawal, and Iraq the highest. Urban transportation costs constitute a small share of total transportation costs in the whole system and in each county. Step 2, Syria, taking the return flows and released water from Turkey as exogenously determined (in Step 1), optimally utilizes this exogenous input and the resources within its border. Finally, in Step 3, Iraq optimally utilizes its internal resources and the water inputs from Turkey and Syria (released and return flow waters), as determined in Steps 1 and 2. The step sequence clearly reflects the dominance of upstream countries over downstream countries. In Figure 4 .b, the various two-country coalitions are presented. 
COOPERATION AND CONFLICT: GAME -THEORETIC ANALYSES
Individual and Coalition Strategies
Figure 2: Country Interactions Under Different Configurations of Independence and Cooperation
The ETRBM is appropriately adjusted to reflect the optimization decisions of individual countries and coalitions of countries. The derived optimal benefits are defined below:
NEBt net economic benefit of Turkey NEBs net economic benefit of Syria NEBi net economic benefit of Iraq NEBts net economic benefit of Turkey and Syria NEBiTS net economic benefit of Iraq given the TS coalition NEBtiS net economic benefit of Turkey and Iraq given Syria's action NEBsTI net economic benefit of Syria given the TI coalition NEBsi net economic benefit of Syria and Iraq NEBtsi net economic benefit of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq
a. Independent Action by Individual Countries
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Core, Shapley Value, and Subsidy Determination
Consider the total benefits of the grand coalition, NEBtsi. This is clearly the maximum aggregate benefit achievable by the three countries. The problem is to allocate this aggregate benefit among the three countries in a way that will persuade them to accept this allocation. Let X t , X s , and X i be the benefits allocated to Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, respectively. This allocation should then verify that
This allocation, to be sustainable, should verify both individual and coalition rationality constraints, so that no country acting alone or within a coalition, has an incentive to reject the allocation. The three coalition constraints are straightforwardly represented by
Equations (22) - (24). The case of the individual rationality constraints is a little more complicated. Indeed, a given country c may act individually under two situations: (a) the other two countries also act individually, and (b) they act as a coalition. The benefits to country c under these two situations need not be the same. We assume that country c aims at guaranteeing to itself the minimum of these two benefits, hence the formulation of the constraints (19) -(21).
The equality (17) and inequalities (19) -(24) may or may not have a solution. In order to find out, the standard approach is to transform this system of inequalities/equality into a linear program (LP), by maximizing or minimizing any linear function of the variables (X t , X s , X i ). If the LP has no solution, then the system of in inequalities/equality has no solution, and the core is empty. A variation on this approach is to modify Equation (17) If the optimal Z* is strictly equal to zero, then the core exists but is reduced to only one point, i.e., only one allocation is acceptable. If Z* is positive, the core is nonempty and made of an infinite number of feasible allocations. The allocation obtained with Z* is sustainable and allows a supra-governmental authority to extract the maximum benefits from the three countries for saving for future use. In this case, Z* can be viewed as the maximum tax. If Z* is negative, then the core is empty. However, if a benefit subsidy in the amount (absolute value) of Z* were added to NEBtsi, then a sustainable allocation would be obtained. Hence, Z* can be viewed as the minimum subsidy to obtain a sustainable benefit allocation.
To illustrate the application of the Shapley method, consider the case of Iraq as the player joining other coalitions. The first case is that of Iraq joining the "empty" 
These incremental benefits are then weighted by the corresponding probabilities of occurrence, and the result is the Shapley allocation of benefits to Iraq.
Benefits Under Different Cooperation Scenarios
The modeling approach presented in the previous sections has been applied under each of 27 parameter scenarios, which are defined as combinations of assumptions regarding energy prices, agricultural productivities, and total water resources. These scenarios are presented in Table 5 . The country benefits are presented in Table 6 , which is organized along the model Table 5 . Table 6 presents the benefits for each country and the total benefit (column) for each cooperation scenario: all countries making individual choices (IND) and countries making choices within coalitions (TS, TI, SI, TSI -row). In the cases of two-country coalitions, 
Core Analyses and Shapley Allocations
This section presents the results obtained by (1) solving the linear program, and
(2) applying the Shapley formula. For each of the 27 different parameter scenarios, we first find out whether the core exists, and, if it does, whether it is reduced to a unique allocation. If it does not, we measure the minimum subsidy needed to create a core.
Finally, we check whether the Shapley allocations are in the core. Tables 7-12 present the results.
In Table 7 the highlighted cells indicate the cases where there is no core. Out of the 27 cases, 6 have no core (B22, B32, C22, C32, C23, C33), 12 have a single-allocation core, and 9 have a multiple-allocation core (i.e., there is an infinite number of allocations in the core). A core always exists under (1) EPR=$0, and (2) agricultural productivity case A (Turkey is more productive). Most of the non-core cases take place when Iraq is more productive (case C), when EPR=$25 or $100, and when resources are more abundant. This is not surprising, as these situations allow individual countries to achieve higher benefits on their own (agriculture for Iraq, energy for Turkey), making it more difficult to achieve a sustainable allocation. Table 8 presents the optimal values of the Z variable in the linear program.
Positive Z values characterize multiple-allocation cores, and present the maximum extractable taxes leading to a residual single-allocation core. Negative Z values characterize non-existing core, and represent the minimum subsidies that would have to be added to the grand coalition benefits to create a single-allocation core. Finally, zero Z values characterize single-allocation cores. Table 8 shows that positive Z values vary between 0.00% and 0.99% of the grand coalition benefits, whereas negative Z values vary between 0.00% and 0.06% of these benefits. Z shows the allocation of the tax, using as weights the Shapley values, and provides additional country benefits, which may be added to the core allocations. The highlighted area shows where the side payments go.
CONCLUSION
The major contribution of this paper is, first, the development of the ETRBM as a backbone model, and, second, its application, using the best available data, to analyses of whether it is possible to find a distribution of the total ETRBM benefits to the three riparian countries -Turkey, Syria, and Iraq -that will provide them incentives to join the water allocation plan that provides the maximum aggregate benefits. This assessment has required an in-depth analysis of the decision-making processes of the three countries and any of their coalitions, through extensive adaptations of the ETRBM. Using concepts and methods of cooperative game theory, we find that, out of the 27 parameter scenarios considered, 21 were characterized by a non-empty core, where such cooperation can be rationally induced. The 6 empty-core cases can be transformed into core cases with a small subsidy, at most 0.06% of the total joint benefit. These cases correspond to high energy prices and high Iraqi agricultural productivity, which clearly strongly benefit Turkey and Iraq acting independently. The Shapley allocation, which is based on the incremental economic power of the participants, also reflects these energy and agricultural productivity effects.
